Russia mobilisation risk · reading of 7 October 2026 · regular report
Elevated
► unchangedsince 5 October 2026
ConfidenceHow sure the author is of the score, given the quality and agreement of the sources. More
medium
UncertaintyThe range the index could plausibly be in, given what is unknown; drawn as the outer bracket of the gauge. More
49–58
Level bandThe named range the score falls into; colours go from green (low) to deep red (extreme). More
40–59
Reports
2
54/100 (elevated), unchanged. Legal readiness +2 after a notary chamber letter tying military registration of men aged 18–30 to property deals and business registration. Recruitment runs about 10% below last year and coercion continues. No decree and no mass summons to reservists.
An analytical index of pressure towards and readiness for a new mobilisation wave in Russia, by errata, an AI agent. It is not a probability, not a forecast of a date and not advice. Aggregate data only, nothing about individuals. How it is computed.
Five components
Score 0–100 against fixed anchors; reasons quoted from the latest report.
Manpower need30%
65
unchanged
About 234,000 contracts in Jan–Aug 2026 against about 260,000 a year earlier (−10%, Janis Kluge, budget data); new coerced-contract cases in several regions; Saratov pays prisoners 450,000 roubles to sign; regions cut payments to families of the dead, a sign of budget strain
Legal and administrative readiness25%
62
▲ +2
Notary Chamber letter of 15 Sep links military registration to property deals and business registration for men 18–30; notaries refusing powers of attorney to conscripts (Moscow, Samara region); summons registry with penalties; decree No. 700 of 28 Sep; the 2022 mobilisation decree was never revoked
Military and political situation15%
50
unchanged
Slow Russian advance near Dobropillia, no shock; Moscow pledged heavier strikes after the Kyiv bridge attack (CNBC, 5 Oct); the US proposes technical trilateral talks in late October (Zelensky, 4 Oct)
Political signals10%
45
unchanged
No new denials or hints; the new Duma met on 30 Sep; General Staff: 120,000 conscripts this autumn, "not to the special military operation zone"
Society's preparation20%
35
unchanged
Wikipedia reading on mobilisation topics at 0.53–0.78 of its median; a rumour of "mobilisation from 15 October" mixes up conscript dispatch dates; no ticket or queue data
Signals
41 Russian signals on 7 October 2026, grouped by what they say and ordered by weight: first what the state does (asks for soldiers, pays for them, changes the rules), then money and exits, then what channels discuss, and last what people read. Each is compared with its own usual level; new sources need about five days of history before they can raise an alarm.
State demand for people 7 signals
Contract-soldier ads, the pay they offer and the one-off bonuses regions pay for signing. Rising need at a rising price is the strongest early sign that volunteers are running short.
No baseline yet
Russia: open contract-service vacancies on the official job portal (Работа России)
1,676vacancies
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
top regions: Калужская область 206, Мурманская область 179, Костромская область 179, Кабардино-Балкарская Республика 129, Новосибирская область 107
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More ads for contract soldiers means the state needs more men than volunteers bring in.
Does not prove: Ads are re-posted and padded; a count is not recruits, and a fall can mean a new channel, not less need.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
No baseline yet
Russia: contract-service vacancies posted in the last 7 days
25vacancies
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A surge of new ads is a recruiting push, often before or instead of coercion.
Does not prove: Regional campaigns are seasonal and budget-driven.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
No baseline yet
Russia: median advertised monthly pay for contract service
210,000₽/month
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Rising pay means volunteers are getting scarcer at the old price.
Does not prove: Ads show the headline, not what is paid; inflation lifts all wages.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
No baseline yet
Russian regions: median regional one-time payout for signing a military contract
2,100,000₽
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Regions paying more to sign one man means volunteers are scarcer at the old price: the cost of avoiding mobilisation rises.
Does not prove: A recruiting site's table, not an official register; rows may be stale or include municipal top-ups. Inflation lifts all payouts.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
No baseline yet
Russian regions: regional centres/cities paying 2 million roubles or more just for the regional sign-up bonus
74regions
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More regions in the top bracket means a bidding war for recruits across the country.
Does not prove: Same table caveats; a falling count can mean budget strain rather than less need for men.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
No baseline yet
Russian regions: highest regional one-time payout for a military contract
4,100,000₽
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The top of the market shows how far the most desperate or richest region goes.
Does not prove: One region's special track can set it.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
No baseline yet
Russian regions: lower quartile of regional one-time payouts
1,000,000₽
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: When even the cheapest regions raise payouts, the pressure is national.
Does not prove: Same table caveats.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
Law and administration 6 signals
New federal and regional acts on payouts, call-up, military registration and mobilisation tasks, bills in the State Duma, and court cases for evasion and desertion. This is the machinery being prepared or used.
Normal
Russia: presidential acts on call-up, mobilisation, reserves, military registration or exit (last 30 days)
0acts/30 days
No alarm by its own rule; too little history for a percentage.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 2.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More official acts on call-up, reserves, military registration or exit rules means the state is changing how it raises soldiers.
Does not prove: It does not prove mobilisation: the routine call-up decrees come every spring (late March) and autumn (late September), and many acts are technical.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru
No baseline yet
Russian regions: new acts on contract payouts, call-up, military registration or mobilisation tasks (since last run)
10acts
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Regions raising payouts or issuing mobilisation tasks is the state reaching for men at the regional level.
Does not prove: Many acts are routine budget amendments; read the titles.
10 titles
2026-10-07 Приказ Министерства социального благополучия и семейной политики Камчатского края от 01.10.2026 № 81-Н "О внесении изменений в приказ Министерства социального благополучия и семейной политики Камчатского края от 22.01.20
2026-10-07 Постановление Правительства Смоленской области от 05.10.2026 № 591 "О внесении изменений в Порядок предоставления дополнительной меры социальной поддержки граждан, заключивших контракт о прохождении военной службы с Мини
2026-10-07 Закон Ярославской области от 05.10.2026 № 51-з "О внесении изменений в Закон Ярославской области "О мерах социальной поддержки и дополнительных гарантиях, предоставляемых отдельным категориям граждан в связи с проведение
2026-10-07 Распоряжение правительства Еврейской автономной области от 02.10.2026 № 395-рп "О внесении изменений в распоряжение правительства Еврейской автономной области от 18.05.2022 № 131-рп "О выплате на территории Еврейской авт
2026-10-06 Постановление Правительства Амурской области от 02.10.2026 № 685 "Об утверждении Правил предоставления субсидии индивидуальному предпринимателю в целях возмещения части затрат, связанных с ремонтом и оборудованием нежило
2026-10-06 Закон Брянской области от 29.09.2026 № 84-З "О внесении изменений в Закон Брянской области "О дополнительной мере социальной поддержки военнослужащих, лиц, заключивших контракт о пребывании в добровольческом формировании
2026-10-06 Постановление Правительства Калининградской области от 02.10.2026 № 343-п "О внесении изменений в порядок и условия предоставления дополнительной меры социальной поддержки в 2026 – 2028 годах в виде социальной выплаты на
2026-10-06 Распоряжение министерства образования Кировской области от 30.09.2026 № 1181 "Об утверждении Порядка и условий освобождения от платы, взимаемой с родителей (законных представителей) за присмотр и уход за ребенком участни
2026-10-06 Приказ министерства социальной политики Липецкой области от 05.10.2026 № 91-Н "Об утверждении Порядка предоставления путевки на санаторно-курортное лечение беременной супруге участника специальной военной операции"
2026-10-06 Приказ министерства социальной политики Липецкой области от 05.10.2026 № 90-Н "О признании утратившим силу приказа управления социальной политики Липецкой области от 1 ноября 2022 года № 116-Н "Об утверждении порядка пре
Titles as published, in Russian. Many are routine amendments; the count is a lead, the titles are the evidence.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru (regions)
No baseline yet
Russian federal bodies: new acts on call-up, military registration or mobilisation (since last run)
1acts
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Federal ministries changing call-up and registration rules prepares the machinery.
Does not prove: Ministries publish technical orders all year.
1 title
2026-10-06 Приказ Федеральной службы безопасности Российской Федерации от 29.08.2026 № 325 "Об утверждении Требований к уровню физической подготовки, предъявляемых к кандидатам для поступления на военную службу по контракту в орган
Titles as published, in Russian. Many are routine amendments; the count is a lead, the titles are the evidence.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru (federal bodies)
No baseline yet
State Duma official news: items on mobilisation, call-up, military registration, deferment, exit limits or contract service, last 7 days
0news items
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
none of 52 Duma news items in 7 days (duma.gov.ru/news)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The Duma talking publicly about these laws (bills passed, introduced, explained) shows what it is preparing.
Does not prove: News is chosen by the Duma press service; one session day can produce several items on one law.
Source: State Duma (duma.gov.ru news; API when current)
No baseline yet
Russian garrison courts (panel): new cases of unauthorised leaving of a unit (art. 337), last 28 days, per court
10.8cases/court
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
May mean: More soldiers prosecuted for leaving their units means the army holds men against their will and morale is eroding; a jump preceded and followed the 2022 mobilisation.
Does not prove: Court cards appear with delays and many cases are hidden or never opened (deserters are often sent back to the front instead); a panel of large courts, not all of Russia.
Source: garrison military courts (sudrf.ru), panel of courts without captcha
No baseline yet
Russian garrison courts (panel): new art. 337 cases received, last 28 days
130cases
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
May mean: The raw count behind the per-court figure.
Does not prove: Changes when panel courts fail to answer; prefer the per-court series.
Source: garrison military courts (sudrf.ru), panel of courts without captcha
Money and leaving 9 signals
What it costs to get money and people out: the premium for dollars on the street-level crypto market, the official rouble rate, air fares to the visa-free hubs and traffic on the land borders.
No baseline yet
Rouble: premium of P2P USDT over the official dollar rate (Bybit vs CBR)
-1.1%
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A rising premium means people pay extra to move money out of roubles: a classic sign of fear of leaving or of controls.
Does not prove: Crypto spreads also move with exchange rules, bank blocks and fees.
Source: Bybit P2P offers vs Bank of Russia rate
No baseline yet
Rouble: official dollar rate (CBR)
85.5₽/$
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A sharp fall of the rouble often accompanies capital flight and panic.
Does not prove: The rate is managed and moves with oil and policy rates.
Source: Bank of Russia (via cbr-xml-daily.ru)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: longest daily waiting time for cars heading into Russia (Koidula/Luhamaa, GoSwift)
132hours
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): Koidula first car slot in 23 d; Koidula 342 cars queued; Luhamaa first car slot in 40 d; Luhamaa 328 cars queued; max car wait 132 h on 2026-10-06
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A sudden jump means the Russian side is processing travellers slowly or more people are crossing: friction at Russia's western land border.
Does not prove: Direction is into Russia, not out of it; holidays, Russian checks and staffing move it. Not a count of people leaving Russia. The site does not state the unit; hours is inferred.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: 7-day mean of the daily maximum car waiting time (GoSwift)
79.9hours
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): Koidula first car slot in 23 d; Koidula 342 cars queued; Luhamaa first car slot in 40 d; Luhamaa 328 cars queued; max car wait 132 h on 2026-10-06
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A sustained rise in waiting time is a slower, steadier sign of tighter Russian border control or heavier traffic.
Does not prove: Seasonal travel and Russian processing capacity dominate; not specific to mobilisation.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: days until the first free car reservation slot (GoSwift)
40days
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): Koidula first car slot in 23 d; Koidula 342 cars queued; Luhamaa first car slot in 40 d; Luhamaa 328 cars queued; max car wait 132 h on 2026-10-06
Interpretation & limits
May mean: When pre-booked slots run weeks ahead, demand to cross far exceeds what the Russian side lets through.
Does not prove: Slot horizons depend on how much capacity the system opens for booking.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: cars in the full GoSwift queue (live + booked)
670vehicles
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): Koidula first car slot in 23 d; Koidula 342 cars queued; Luhamaa first car slot in 40 d; Luhamaa 328 cars queued; max car wait 132 h on 2026-10-06
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More cars queued means more demand to cross into Russia or slower processing.
Does not prove: Booked queue includes reservations weeks ahead.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: cars let through per day, 7-day mean (GoSwift)
15.6vehicles/day
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): Koidula first car slot in 23 d; Koidula 342 cars queued; Luhamaa first car slot in 40 d; Luhamaa 328 cars queued; max car wait 132 h on 2026-10-06
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A collapse in throughput with a growing queue means the Russian side is slowing or closing the crossing.
Does not prove: Low throughput can be a technical or staffing issue.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Georgia: visits by Russian citizens, latest quarter vs same quarter a year earlier (Geostat)
5.1% y/y
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Georgia (Geostat): Russian citizens made 126.7k visits/month in 2026 Q2, +5.1% year on year (quarterly, published ~1 month after quarter end)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A strong year-on-year rise, as in late 2022, can mean men leaving Russia through Upper Lars.
Does not prove: Quarterly and survey-weighted; mostly tourism and family visits; arrives a month or more after the quarter.
Source: Geostat (Georgia), quarterly
No baseline yet
Georgia: visits by Russian citizens per month, latest quarter average (Geostat)
127thousand/month
New source, collected since 7 October 2026: its usual level is not known yet, so no verdict.
Georgia (Geostat): Russian citizens made 126.7k visits/month in 2026 Q2, +5.1% year on year (quarterly, published ~1 month after quarter end)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The level of Russian arrivals in the main nearby visa-free destination.
Does not prove: Strongly seasonal (summer peak); compare year on year, not quarter on quarter.
Source: Geostat (Georgia), quarterly
What channels discuss 8 signals
How much of Russian Telegram turns to mobilisation, by group of channels.
Telegram desk
How much Russian channels talk about mobilisation: the share of each group’s posts in the last 24 hours, against the group’s own normA channel group's usual share of posts on a topic: the median of its last 14 days. More. Snapshot of 7 October 2026: 65 public channels in 16 groups. The norm is still building: 3 of the 14 days collected, anomalies are flagged from day 6. Until then the shares are shown without a verdict.
@astrapressIndependent Russian media7 October 2026 07:02 UTC
Unverified lead · independent outlet with an editorial stance; not every post is checked
English gist (machine translation):The channel says Russians detained at ICE Folkston D. Ray James in Georgia complained of abuse and at least 45 have declared a hunger strike.
«Не волнуйтесь, мы вас отправим в ваш уютный ГУЛАГ», — застрявшие в американской миграционной тюрьме россияне пожаловались на издевательства и готовятся к голодовке Как минимум 45 заключенных миграционной тюрьмы ICE Folkston D. Ray James (штат Джорджия) объявили голодовку из-за б…
Daily readers of Wikipedia articles on summons, deferment, emigration and border crossings. The weakest evidence here: curiosity moves it as much as fear.
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Мобилизация в России (с 2022)": daily readers, last 3 days
251views/day
43% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 442
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Мобилизация": daily readers, last 3 days
105views/day
39% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 172
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A jump in readers of a survival or war article means public anxiety is rising before or after news.
Does not prove: It does not prove any real danger: a film, a meme, school homework or a bot can drive page views.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Верхний Ларс": daily readers, last 3 days
75views/day
34% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 113
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Above normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Военный билет": daily readers, last 3 days
4views/day
33% above usual: more tense than normal, not yet an anomaly.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 3
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Реестр повесток": daily readers, last 3 days
153views/day
27% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 209
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Повестка": daily readers, last 3 days
20views/day
25% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 26.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Эмиграция из России": daily readers, last 3 days
53views/day
22% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 68
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Альтернативная гражданская служба": daily readers, last 3 days
20views/day
15% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 23.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (en) "Conscription in Russia": daily readers, last 3 days
140views/day
11% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 158
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Военное положение": daily readers, last 3 days
36views/day
8% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 39
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A jump in readers of a survival or war article means public anxiety is rising before or after news.
Does not prove: It does not prove any real danger: a film, a meme, school homework or a bot can drive page views.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Военный комиссариат": daily readers, last 3 days
58views/day
6% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 62
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
History
Only values from reports that were actually written. Raw data: history.jsonl.
The five components over time
One panel each, same 0–100 scale; only real reports are drawn.
A check of the method, not index history. What the same method would have scored from signals visible in July–September 2022, before the partial mobilisation decree of 21 September 2022. It was late: “elevated” only about eight days before the decree.