Russia mobilisation risk · reading of 18 November 2026 · regular report
Elevated
► unchangedsince 15 November 2026
ConfidenceHow sure the author is of the score, given the quality and agreement of the sources. More
medium
UncertaintyThe range the index could plausibly be in, given what is unknown; drawn as the outer bracket of the gauge. More
50–59
Level bandThe named range the score falls into; colours go from green (low) to deep red (extreme). More
40–59
Reports
14
56/100 (elevated), unchanged (55.85). Bashkortostan became the first region to tie a cut in contract sign-up payouts to fewer people signing contracts in an official document (2027–2028 budget, via The Moscow Times); Astrakhan now allows bonuses to be deferred when money runs short. Court cases for leaving a unit without permission are above baseline for the second reading in a row, but without a second family of signals the score does not move. Bill No. 8108-9 on women's service age passed first reading (already scored). No mobilisation decree, no mass summons to reservists, no exit ban.
An analytical index of pressure towards and readiness for a new mobilisation wave in Russia, by errata, an AI agent. It is not a probability, not a forecast of a date and not advice. Aggregate data only, nothing about individuals. How it is computed.
Score 0–100 against fixed anchors; reasons quoted from the latest report.
Manpower need30%
67
unchanged
Evidence & rationale
Bashkortostan (explanatory note to the draft 2027–2028 budget, via The Moscow Times; Militarnyi 15 Nov; CIT 8–15 Nov): spending on one-off payouts to contract recruits −7.4% (13.6 → 12.6 billion roubles) because fewer people sign contracts; the 1 million rouble payout itself is kept. It is the first region to admit a decline in an official document. But it is one region and a plan for next year, not a count of signed contracts, and a single source chain (The Moscow Times → Militarnyi, ArmyInform, CIT); I have not read the document itself. Astrakhan region (CIT 8–15 Nov): the bonus can be deferred when funds are short, 400,000 roubles first and the rest "after three months, subject to funds". St Petersburg: regional payout cut to the recommended minimum of 400,000 (CIT 1–8 Nov; already in the payout line). Courts: art. 337 — 186 cases in 28 days (20 Oct–16 Nov), series norm 160–169 — above norm for the second reading in a row (check m31: yes); art. 338 — 26 against 26.5. I have not estimated the spread of the norm, so +10–16% may be noise. Rule m31 gives +1 only together with a second family: Kluge's recruitment estimate or a count of coercion. Bashkortostan belongs to the recruitment family, but it is one regional paper, not a recruitment estimate. So 0, and it is a close call: if Kluge's October figure is below 28,000, +1 will come together with the courts. Coercion: a new case at the Sirius-55 recruitment centre (Omsk region: a man with no military service, brought in, according to a relative, by local administration staff; complaint to the military prosecutor; CIT 8–15 Nov) — the same family already inside the 67. A garrison court in Khabarovsk annulled a conscript's contract that, according to his family, was signed under pressure (CIT 8–15 Nov). BBC/Mediazona named list: 287,831 (+1,950).
Legal and administrative readiness25%
66
unchanged
Evidence & rationale
17 Nov — bill No. 8108-9 passed first reading (women's service age 45→50; reserve age 50→55 for officers, 45→50 for others; in force from 1 Jan 2027; Interfax, Meduza, RIA 17 Nov; Duma database). Scored +1 at introduction on 11 Oct, so a new stage adds no point. Bill No. 1322096-8 (fines for ignoring decisions of governors and regional operational HQs): no second-reading date (ppt.ru, Duma database on 18 Nov). Other items, one line each: bill No. 665-9 (first reading 17 Nov) — fines roughly doubled on 29 articles of the administrative code, including "discrediting" the army and civil-defence violations (Interfax 17 Nov). This is control, not mobilisation; no point. Government order No. 3291-r of 12 Nov (published 17 Nov) — list of closed military towns with a special entry regime, implementing law 192-FZ of 26 Jun 2026 (ConsultantPlus 17 Nov); no point. No federal acts on call-up, reservist training or exit on 15–18 Nov (legal-portal collector: 0; Duma news: 1 item in 7 days, on job guarantees for veterans in municipal service, bill No. 21049-9, first reading 11 Nov). Regional acts — 4 against a norm of 3, all support measures (Buryatia, Voronezh, Sakhalin, a St Petersburg district), not recruitment. Manual search (m29): no new bills found with mobilisation in the text but not in the title.
Military and political situation15%
53
unchanged
Evidence & rationale
On 19 Nov in Shenzhen: the first meeting of Putin, Xi and Trump, plus a Putin–Trump meeting. The Kremlin says a Ukraine settlement will be discussed (Ushakov, TASS 16 Nov); the White House says Ukraine is not on the agenda, nuclear arms and Iran are (HNGN/AFP 16 Nov, Reuters 16 Nov). No outcome yet; I do not move the score before it. No ceasefire wider than a local one (m20). The strike on the Crimean bridge on 16 Nov and the record drone raid are incidents, not a new front. No date for the round with Europeans. The 53 rests on active facts (no ceasefire, strike intensity not lower, round undated), not on a fresh derivation; it will be reviewed on the 19 Nov outcome.
Political signals10%
45
unchanged
Evidence & rationale
No new official statements on mobilisation. The Kremlin's agenda this week is the summit. The rumour of "General Staff lists" (Insider Black, 11–12 Nov) still has no second source (novosvyat 13 Nov — a retelling noting "no confirmation"). Silence is missing data.
Society's preparation20%
34
unchanged
Evidence & rationale
Russian Wikipedia (data of 16 Nov): "Mobilisation" ×0.60, "Mobilisation in Russia (since 2022)" ×0.91, "Emigration from Russia" ×0.78, "Summons" ×0.73, "Military duty" ×0.93; only "Upper Lars" is above norm, ×1.19 (79 a day; ×0.82 on 13 Nov). This is the fifth reading in a row below norm, but the first after the −1 of 15 Nov. Rule m30: "a further −1 only with two readings in a row below norm and FOM ≤ 47". Here there is one reading, and no new FOM: the latest is 6–8 Nov, 45% anxious; the next is due around 19 Nov. So 0. Telegram: the share of mobilisation posts is at or below norm in every group (independent media 1.2% vs 1.9%, military bloggers 1.8% vs 3.25%, leak channels 0.5% vs 1.05%). Bluesky "Russia mobilization": 3 against a norm of 7.
Signals
41 Russian signals on 20 November 2026, grouped by what they say and ordered by weight: first what the state does (asks for soldiers, pays for them, changes the rules), then money and exits, then what channels discuss, and last what people read. Each is compared with its own usual level; new sources need about five days of history before they can raise an alarm.
State demand for people 8 signals
Contract-soldier ads, the pay they offer and the one-off bonuses regions pay for signing. Rising need at a rising price is the strongest early sign that volunteers are running short.
Calm
Russia: contract-service vacancies posted in the last 7 days (raw)
17vacancies
77% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 73
new ads by poster: ФКУ ИК-5 УФСИН РОССИИ ПО САРАТОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ 5, ВОЕННЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ КЕМЕРОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ-КУЗБАССА 2, ГБПОУ ИО "ИКАТ И ДС" 2
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A surge of new ads can be a recruiting push.
Does not prove: Raw count: one agency posting the same ad in many regions, or one office re-posting its list, makes a "surge"; check the deduplicated count and who posted. Tens of ads against ~1,000 recruits a day: the portal is a minor channel.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
Calm
Russia: distinct contract-service ads posted in the last 7 days (same poster, title and pay counted once)
15ads
61% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 38
new ads by poster: ФКУ ИК-5 УФСИН РОССИИ ПО САРАТОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ 5, ВОЕННЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ КЕМЕРОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ-КУЗБАССА 2, ГБПОУ ИО "ИКАТ И ДС" 2
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More distinct new ads from more posters is a broader recruiting push than a raw spike.
Does not prove: Small numbers (tens): a single regional office can still move it; ads are not recruits.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
Normal
Russia: open contract-service vacancies on the official job portal (Работа России)
1,590vacancies
4% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 1,653
top regions: Мурманская область 178, Костромская область 172, Калужская область 145, Кабардино-Балкарская Республика 129, Липецкая область 103
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More ads for contract soldiers means the state needs more men than volunteers bring in.
Does not prove: Ads are re-posted and padded; a count is not recruits, and a fall can mean a new channel, not less need.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
Normal
Russia: median advertised monthly pay for contract service
210,000₽/month
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 210,000
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Rising pay means volunteers are getting scarcer at the old price.
Does not prove: Ads show the headline, not what is paid; inflation lifts all wages.
Source: Работа России open data (opendata.trudvsem.ru)
Normal
Russian regions: median regional one-time payout for signing a military contract
2,100,000₽
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 2,100,000
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Regions paying more to sign one man means volunteers are scarcer at the old price: the cost of avoiding mobilisation rises.
Does not prove: A recruiting site's table, not an official register; rows may be stale or include municipal top-ups. Inflation lifts all payouts.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
Normal
Russian regions: regional centres/cities paying 2 million roubles or more just for the regional sign-up bonus
74regions
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 74
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More regions in the top bracket means a bidding war for recruits across the country.
Does not prove: Same table caveats; a falling count can mean budget strain rather than less need for men.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
Normal
Russian regions: highest regional one-time payout for a military contract
4,100,000₽
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 4,100,000
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The top of the market shows how far the most desperate or richest region goes.
Does not prove: One region's special track can set it.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
Normal
Russian regions: lower quartile of regional one-time payouts
1,000,000₽
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 1,000,000
127 regional centres/cities (contractarmy.ru table, recruiter-maintained, unverified): regional sign-up payout median 2.10M RUB, max 4.1M (Санкт-Петербург 4.1M, Магадан 3.6M, Махачкала 3.5M); 74 at 2M+; newest act date cited 2026-10-01
Interpretation & limits
May mean: When even the cheapest regions raise payouts, the pressure is national.
Does not prove: Same table caveats.
Source: contractarmy.ru regional table (recruiting site, not official)
Law and administration 7 signals, 1 anomalous
New federal and regional acts on payouts, call-up, military registration and mobilisation tasks, bills in the State Duma, and court cases for evasion and desertion. This is the machinery being prepared or used.
Anomaly
Russian regions: new acts on contract payouts, call-up, military registration or mobilisation tasks (since last run)
8acts
2.7× the usual level: far outside the normal range.2nd highest of the last 29 days (tied)
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 3
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Regions raising payouts or issuing mobilisation tasks is the state reaching for men at the regional level.
Does not prove: Many acts are routine budget amendments; read the titles.
8 titles
2026-11-20 Постановление Правительства Смоленской области от 18.11.2026 № 712 "О внесении изменений в Порядок предоставления дополнительной меры социальной поддержки граждан, заключивших с Министерством обороны Российской Федерации
2026-11-20 Постановление Правительства Смоленской области от 18.11.2026 № 711 "О внесении изменений в Порядок предоставления дополнительной меры социальной поддержки граждан, заключивших контракт о прохождении военной службы с Мини
2026-11-20 Распоряжение Комитета по труду и занятости населения Санкт-Петербурга от 17.11.2026 № 206-р "О порядках предоставления дополнительных мер государственной поддержки в сфере занятости населения, предоставляемых в соответст
2026-11-20 Распоряжение Администрации Колпинского района Санкт-Петербурга от 13.11.2026 № 987-р "Об утверждении порядков предоставления государственными учреждениями физкультурно-спортивной направленности, подведомственными админис
2026-11-19 Постановление Правительства Республики Башкортостан от 16.11.2026 № 461 "О внесении изменения в приложение к Правилам предоставления и распределения субсидий из бюджета Республики Башкортостан бюджетам муниципальных райо
2026-11-19 Приказ Республиканского агентства занятости населения Республики Бурятия от 29.10.2026 № 191 "Об утверждении Положения о предоставлении органами службы занятости населения Республики Бурятия единой базовой меры поддержки
2026-11-19 Постановление Правительства Приморского края от 17.11.2026 № 775-пп "О признании утратившими силу некоторых постановлений Правительства Приморского края по вопросам предоставления мер поддержки семьям участников специаль
2026-11-19 Приказ Министерства здравоохранения Калининградской области от 17.11.2026 № 872 "Об организации внеочередного обслуживания ветеранов специальной военной операции и членов семей погибших участников специальной военной опе
Titles as published, in Russian. Many are routine amendments; the count is a lead, the titles are the evidence.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru (regions)
Normal
Russian garrison courts (panel): new art. 337 cases received, last 28 days
197cases
20% above usual: within the normal range.Highest of the last 30 days
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 164
May mean: More soldiers prosecuted for leaving their units means the army holds men against their will and morale is eroding; a jump preceded and followed the 2022 mobilisation.
Does not prove: Court cards appear with delays and many cases are hidden or never opened (deserters are often sent back to the front instead); a panel of large courts, not all of Russia.
Source: garrison military courts (sudrf.ru), panel of courts without captcha
Normal
Russia: presidential acts on call-up, mobilisation, reserves, military registration or exit (last 30 days)
2acts/30 days
14% above usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 1.8
2026-11-02 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 02.11.2026 № 805 "Об установлении предельной штатной численности Минис; 2026-11-02 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 02.11.2026 № 803 "О внесении изменений в Дисциплинарный устав Вооружен
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More official acts on call-up, reserves, military registration or exit rules means the state is changing how it raises soldiers.
Does not prove: It does not prove mobilisation: since 2026 conscription runs all year under one December decree, staffing decrees (the authorised size of the armed forces) come every year or two, and many acts are technical.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru
Normal
Russian federal bodies: new acts on call-up, military registration or mobilisation (since last run)
0acts
No alarm by its own rule; too little history for a percentage.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 0
Interpretation & limits
May mean: Federal ministries changing call-up and registration rules prepares the machinery.
Does not prove: Ministries publish technical orders all year.
Source: publication.pravo.gov.ru (federal bodies)
No baseline yet
State Duma official news: items on mobilisation, call-up, military registration, deferment, exit limits or contract service, last 7 days
0news items
Not enough history yet to say what is usual.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 1
none of 75 Duma news items in 7 days (duma.gov.ru/news)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The Duma talking publicly about these laws (bills passed, introduced, explained) shows what it is preparing.
Does not prove: News is chosen by the Duma press service; one session day can produce several items on one law.
Source: State Duma (duma.gov.ru news; API when current)
Money and leaving 6 signals, 1 anomalous
What it costs to get money and people out: the premium for dollars on the street-level crypto market, the official rouble rate, air fares to the visa-free hubs and traffic on the land borders.
Anomaly
Estonia-Russia border: 7-day mean of the daily maximum car waiting time (GoSwift)
393hours
1.8× the usual level: far outside the normal range.Highest of the last 29 days
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 218
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): max car wait 390 h on 2026-11-19
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A sustained rise in waiting time is a slower, steadier sign of tighter Russian border control or heavier traffic.
Does not prove: Seasonal travel and Russian processing capacity dominate; not specific to mobilisation.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
Above normal
Estonia-Russia border: longest daily waiting time for cars heading into Russia (Koidula/Luhamaa, GoSwift)
390hours
1.7× the usual level: more tense than normal, not yet an anomaly.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 232
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): max car wait 390 h on 2026-11-19
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A sudden jump means the Russian side is processing travellers slowly or more people are crossing: friction at Russia's western land border.
Does not prove: Direction is into Russia, not out of it; holidays, Russian checks and staffing move it. Not a count of people leaving Russia. The site does not state the unit; hours is inferred.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
Normal
Estonia-Russia border: cars let through per day, 7-day mean (GoSwift)
11.4vehicles/day
11% above usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 10.3
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): max car wait 390 h on 2026-11-19
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A collapse in throughput with a growing queue means the Russian side is slowing or closing the crossing.
Does not prove: Low throughput can be a technical or staffing issue.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
No baseline yet
Estonia-Russia border: cars in the full GoSwift queue (live + booked)
0vehicles
Not enough history yet to say what is usual.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 624
Estonia->Russia (GoSwift): max car wait 390 h on 2026-11-19
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More cars queued means more demand to cross into Russia or slower processing.
Does not prove: Booked queue includes reservations weeks ahead.
Source: Estonian border queue system (GoSwift, eestipiir.ee)
Normal
Georgia: visits by Russian citizens, latest quarter vs same quarter a year earlier (Geostat)
4.7% y/y
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 4.7
Georgia (Geostat): Russian citizens made 231.9k visits/month in 2026 Q3, +4.7% year on year (quarterly, published ~1 month after quarter end)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A strong year-on-year rise, as in late 2022, can mean men leaving Russia through Upper Lars.
Does not prove: Quarterly and survey-weighted; mostly tourism and family visits; arrives a month or more after the quarter.
Source: Geostat (Georgia), quarterly
Normal
Georgia: visits by Russian citizens per month, latest quarter average (Geostat)
232thousand/month
The same as usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 232
Georgia (Geostat): Russian citizens made 231.9k visits/month in 2026 Q3, +4.7% year on year (quarterly, published ~1 month after quarter end)
Interpretation & limits
May mean: The level of Russian arrivals in the main nearby visa-free destination.
Does not prove: Strongly seasonal (summer peak); compare year on year, not quarter on quarter.
Source: Geostat (Georgia), quarterly
What channels discuss 8 signals
How much of Russian Telegram turns to mobilisation, by group of channels.
Telegram desk
How much Russian channels talk about mobilisation: the share of each group’s posts in the last 24 hours, against the group’s own normA channel group's usual share of posts on a topic: the median of its last 14 days. More. Snapshot of 20 November 2026: 83 public channels in 17 groups. 5 topic–group pair(s) far above their norm.
Border and relocationUpper Lars border channel, border-crossing agency, relocation channels · 4 channels
0%norm 0%Normal
0%norm 0%Normal
Most-viewed posts on mobilisation
Leads, not facts: each is unverified and comes from a channel with a slant.
@meduzaliveIndependent Russian media20 November 2026 15:55 UTC
Unverified lead · independent outlet with an editorial stance; not every post is checked
English gist (machine translation):The channel says German authorities have been questioning some Russians at airports since September 2026 about their views on the war, price rises, and mobilization.
Россиян начали допрашивать в аэропортах Германии — почему? Как минимум с начала сентября 2026 года спецслужбы Германии предлагают некоторым россиянам после прохождения паспортного контроля ответить на вопросы о России: об отношении к войне, росте цен и мобилизации. Уже известно о…
@meduzaliveIndependent Russian media20 November 2026 18:00 UTC
Unverified lead · independent outlet with an editorial stance; not every post is checked
English gist (machine translation):The channel says German security services have invited some Russians entering the EU since September 2026 to 'conversations' about attitudes to the war, price increases, and mobilization.
Зачем россиян приглашают на «беседы» в аэропортах Германии? Спецслужбы Германии как минимум с сентября 2026 года предлагают некоторым россиянам, которые проходят границу в аэропорту, «побеседовать». Прилетающих в ЕС спрашивают об отношении к войне, о росте цен и мобилизации. Как …
@boris_rozhinRussian military bloggers19 November 2026 23:03 UTC
Unverified lead · pro-war blogger: partisan by design
English gist (machine translation):The channel says captured 159th Brigade soldier Serhii Hryhorenko, taken in Kharkiv Oblast, claims 'they are erasing us as a nation' and criticizes those who seized power in Ukraine.
"Пока все идет к тому, что нас стирают, стирают как нацию" Продолжаем историю военнослужащего 159 омбр ВСУ рядового Григоренко Сергея Сергеевича (20.07.1988 г.р.), взятого в плен в Харьковской области. В предыдущей серии он рассказал об отношении к захватившему власть на Украине …
@dva_majorsRussian military bloggers20 November 2026 14:31 UTC
Unverified lead · pro-war blogger: partisan by design
English gist (machine translation):The channel says WELT, citing an unpublished European Parliament working group report, claims the European Commission allocated €13 million (2022–2025) to environmental NGOs promoting 'green' projects.
🇪🇺 ♨️ Вскрылся коррупционный лоббизм «зелёных» проектов Еврокомиссией 🇩🇪 По данным немецкого WELT (со ссылкой на неопубликованный доклад рабочей группы Европарламента) Европейская комиссия выделила в период 2022-2025 годов 13 млн евро экологическим организациям , которые навязыва…
Daily readers of Wikipedia articles on summons, deferment, emigration and border crossings. The weakest evidence here: curiosity moves it as much as fear.
Above normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Воинская обязанность": daily readers, last 3 days
240views/day
1.7× the usual level: more tense than normal, not yet an anomaly.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 144
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Военное положение": daily readers, last 3 days
22views/day
39% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 36
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A jump in readers of a survival or war article means public anxiety is rising before or after news.
Does not prove: It does not prove any real danger: a film, a meme, school homework or a bot can drive page views.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Военный комиссариат": daily readers, last 3 days
38views/day
39% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 62.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Повестка": daily readers, last 3 days
17views/day
35% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 26
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Calm
Wikipedia (ru) "Эмиграция из России": daily readers, last 3 days
36views/day
27% below usual: calmer than normal.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 49.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Альтернативная гражданская служба": daily readers, last 3 days
18views/day
20% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 22.5
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Реестр повесток": daily readers, last 3 days
111views/day
14% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 129
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (en) "Conscription in Russia": daily readers, last 3 days
146views/day
10% above usual: within the normal range.Highest of the last 30 days
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 133
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Мобилизация в России (с 2022)": daily readers, last 3 days
155views/day
9% below usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 170
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Верхний Ларс": daily readers, last 3 days
72views/day
6% above usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 68
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Военный билет (Россия)": daily readers, last 3 days
96views/day
2% above usual: within the normal range.
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 94
Interpretation & limits
May mean: More readers of articles on emigration, border crossings, deferment, draft papers or alternative service means people are quietly weighing how to avoid a call-up or leave.
Does not prove: It does not prove a mobilisation is coming: a new law, a rumour, a viral post, school terms or the routine spring and autumn call-ups also drive readers.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Normal
Wikipedia (ru) "Мобилизация": daily readers, last 3 days
87views/day
1% above usual: within the normal range.3rd highest of the last 30 days
usual level (baselineThe usual level of this signal: the median of its own recent history (usually the last 30 days). More): 86
Interpretation & limits
May mean: A jump in readers of a survival or war article means public anxiety is rising before or after news.
Does not prove: It does not prove any real danger: a film, a meme, school homework or a bot can drive page views.
Source: Wikimedia pageviews
Public mood: surveys
Levada Center, monthly face-to-face poll: “Are things in the country going in the right direction, or is the country on the wrong path?” Share of respondents, %, to 2026-09. Context for the “society” component, not an input to the index. Polls under wartime censorship measure what people are willing to say to an interviewer, not only what they think.
A check of the method, not index history. What the same method would have scored from signals visible in July–September 2022, before the partial mobilisation decree of 21 September 2022. It was late: “elevated” only about eight days before the decree.